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Between Idealism and Pragmatism: The Tension of People's Sovereignty and Political Party Control in Indonesia's Representative Democracy

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Abstract

This study examines the persistent tension between the ideal of people's sovereignty and the pragmatic dominance of political party control within Indonesia's representative democracy. Rooted in the constitutional mandate that sovereignty resides in the people, the analysis investigates how institutional mechanisms, such as parliamentary thresholds, candidate selection systems, and party discipline, mediate or constrain that sovereignty. Employing a qualitative normative-analytical method supported by empirical data from the General Elections Commission (KPU), Kompas Research and Development, and the Indonesia National Survey Project (INSP), the study critically assesses how legal structures and political behavior interact to shape democratic legitimacy. The findings reveal that electoral thresholds, while justified as stabilizing instruments, have systematically excluded millions of votes from legislative representation, as evidenced by the 17.3 million "wasted votes" recorded in the 2024 election. Simultaneously, persistent low public trust in political parties, averaging between 44% and 55% from 2017 to 2023, demonstrates a widening distance between citizens and party institutions. The discussion highlights that these patterns perpetuate a pragmatic logic of governance that prioritizes stability, patronage, and coalition survival over inclusivity and accountability. Although reform efforts, such as judicial scrutiny of threshold policies and calls for internal party democratization, indicate ongoing attempts to realign practice with constitutional ideals, their impact remains limited by entrenched elite interests. Ultimately, the study argues that Indonesia's democratic consolidation depends on recalibrating the institutional balance between representation and control, ensuring that sovereignty is not merely procedural but substantively exercised by the people..

Keywords : *People's sovereignty, political party control, parliamentary threshold, democratic legitimacy, Indonesia.*



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INTRODUCTION

Indonesia's constitutional framework affirms that sovereignty lies with the people, a principle enshrined in Article 1(2) of the 1945 Constitution, which states that "sovereignty is in the hands of the people and implemented according to the Constitution" (Aulia, & Isra, 2024). This idealism of people's sovereignty is not merely symbolic, but foundational in the institutional design of Indonesia's post-Reformasi democracy, including general elections, representative assemblies, checks and balances, and legal oversight bodies. Yet in practice, tension arises when political parties whose role is to represent the will of the people, become powerful gatekeepers of that representation, influencing candidate selection, agenda setting, and legislative behaviour in ways that may diverge from popular demands.

The pragmatism exerted by parties in pursuing power, coalition, patronage, and electoral competitiveness often demands trade-offs among ideals of accountability, transparency, and responsiveness (Norris, 2012). Understanding this tension between people's sovereignty (as ideal) and political party control (as pragmatic reality) demands empirical data about electoral outcomes, public attitudes, and party institutional structures.

One axis of evidence concerns how many parties actually manage to obtain seats in the People's Representative Council (DPR), especially given electoral thresholds, and how many votes cast by citizens fail to translate into representation. In the 2024 legislative elections, for instance, a parliamentary threshold of 4% of the valid national vote determined which parties would be granted DPR seats, automatically excluding many smaller parties and thus many voters whose votes were for

those parties (Jaffrey, & Warburton, 2024). The parties that passed the threshold achieved a distribution of votes among the winners which reflect both popular support and strategic voting, but also leave a segment of the electorate unrepresented in the legislature (Luna, 2014). Pragmatically, thresholds are defended on grounds of reducing fragmentation and ensuring governability, but they constrain the ideal that every citizen's vote should count equally towards representation. Inevitably, this institutional design highlights the tension: ideal of universal inclusion vs pragmatism of party system stability.

To illustrate more concretely the recent balance of party control in parliament vs voter support, the following table summarizes the 2024 election results for major parties that passed the 4% threshold:

Table 1. Distribution of Votes and Parliamentary Seats in the 2024 Indonesian Legislative Election

Political Party	Valid Votes	Percentage of National Valid Votes	Number of DPR Seats	Implication for Representation
Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P)	25,387,279	16.72%	110 seats	Largest single party, but still far from majority control; must rely on coalition.
Golkar Party	23,208,654	15.28%	102 seats	Has strong institutional resources; often pivotal in forming governing coalitions.
Gerindra Party	20,071,708	13.22%	86 seats	Emergent force under charismatic leadership; strategic in balancing power.
National Awakening Party (PKB)	16,115,665	10.61%	—	Reflects specific demographic/regional appeal; though significant votes, its bargaining power depends on coalition.
NasDem, Demokrat, PAN etc. (other parties above threshold)	various	between ~7-10% each	fewer seats proportionally	Illustrates that many parties with moderate vote share still cannot dominate agenda.

Source: Kompas (2024)

This table shows that although several parties have substantial vote shares, no single party can act alone, which enhances the role of party control, coalition formation, and often compromises that may distance representation from popular expectations. Public attitudes provide another dimension of evidence: surveys show low levels of partisan identification, weak emotional or psychological ties between voters and political parties, and declining trust in political parties and the legislature. According to reporting, over the past two decades the “party id rate” among Indonesian voters has seldom exceeded 10-15%, meaning nearly 90% of voters do not feel strong identification with any particular party (Kompas, 2023).

Trust levels mirror this: in October 2022, public trust in political parties was about 44%, in the DPR about 48%, both much lower than trust in institutions such as TNI (88%) or the presidency 80% (Kompas, 2023). Such low levels of identification and trust suggest that people's sovereignty in sentiment is not fully mediated through parties, or that parties are not sufficiently responsive or credible

to voters' expectations. The discrepancy between electoral legitimacy (votes) and effectiveness or accountability (what parties do once in power) deepens the tension.

Institutional reforms over time have attempted to address some of these tensions, but often introduce new trade-offs that favor party control. For example, thresholds and electoral laws aimed at streamlining the party system and limiting fragmentation are justified in terms of efficiency, preventing unstable coalitions, reducing costs of governance, and enhancing clarity of voter choices. However, higher thresholds also tend to marginalize new or smaller groups, inhibit political diversity, and force convergence of party platforms toward pragmatic concern to win, rather than ideological expression or representation of more peripheral views. Similarly, candidate selection within parties is often highly centralized or dominated by party elites, who may prioritize loyalty, resources, or strategic positioning over grassroots responsiveness or merit. The tension is compounded when party discipline in the legislature binds representatives to voting with party positions, even when those positions diverge from local or popular preferences; this discipline is sometimes defended pragmatically as necessary for coherent policy or coalition stability (Hohendorf, 2025).

Another area where the tension between idealism and pragmatism surfaces is in the domain of policy making and legislative behaviour. Citizens expect that representatives should voice the needs, demands, and grievances of their constituencies health, education, infrastructure, social justice yet parties often pursue policies that reflect elite negotiations, coalition bargains, or political survival calculus, sometimes at odds with popular demands.

Pragmatic compromises, such as watering down regulatory reforms, diluting anti-corruption measures, or postponing social spending, may ensure majority in parliament or reduce conflict with powerful interest groups (Stapenhurst et al., 2006). Idealistic expectations from civil society, media, and citizens often demand transparency, integrity, and responsiveness, but the constraints of party control, resource dependencies, and intra-party power structures frequently limit how fully those expectations can be realized. Thus, the clash between citizens' desire for sovereignty and parties' need for control plays itself out not just in formal institutions but in everyday governance outcomes.

Historical legacies contribute significantly to the current balance: Indonesia's experience under the New Order regime (Soeharto era) centralized party control, suppressed dissent, manipulated electoral mechanisms, and prioritized regime stability over genuine people's representation. The Reformasi period since 1998 attempted to undo many of these legacies, introducing freer elections, multiparty competition, decentralization, legal protections, and more open media. Yet some institutional vestiges remain: parties still command advantages in resources, networks, and regulatory influence that newcomers or independent actors lack; the culture of patronage remains strong in many domains; and citizens often perceive that political change is incremental rather than transformational. The pragmatism of political actors sometimes reverts to mechanisms of control inherited from authoritarian pasts, party machines, elite bargaining, informal norms, especially when electoral uncertainty or complexity challenges governance. The idealism of Reformasi is thus in constant negotiation with pragmatism (Permana, 2017).

Legal and constitutional checks, oversight bodies, and public accountability mechanisms represent further dimensions where tension is manifest. The presence of the Constitutional Court, election supervisory bodies (Bawaslu), audit institutions, and media oversight theoretically bolster the people's sovereignty by enabling challenge, dissent, and review (Firmansyah, 2024). However, such bodies often face constraints: political influence, limited resources, bureaucratic inertia, or legal ambiguities that political parties or coalitions exploit to maintain control.

For instance, court rulings on electoral laws or thresholds may be contested or partially implemented; oversight of party finances or campaign violations is often reactive rather than preventive. Pragmatically, parties may defer to procedural compliance without embracing substantive transparency or responsiveness. Meanwhile, citizens may perceive oversight as insufficient or symbolic if outcomes do not align with expectations of fairness or justice.

RESEARCH METHODS

This study employs a qualitative normative-analytical approach designed to examine the conceptual and institutional interplay between the principle of people's sovereignty and the pragmatic dominance of political parties within Indonesia's representative democracy (Eddy, et al., 2013). The research is primarily doctrinal and interpretative, drawing upon constitutional provisions, electoral laws,

and political party regulations, particularly those contained in the 1945 Constitution, Law No. 7 of 2017 on General Elections, and Law No. 2 of 2011 on Political Parties. To complement the normative inquiry, the study integrates empirical evidence derived from official electoral data issued by the General Elections Commission (KPU), survey findings from credible research institutions such as *Kompas Research and Development* and *Indikator Politik Indonesia*, and secondary analyses from reputable journals and policy reports. The data are critically examined through a hermeneutic and comparative lens, allowing the study to uncover how the formal ideal of popular sovereignty operates within the pragmatic structures of party-centered representation.

The analytical framework adopts a descriptive–evaluative orientation, which systematically maps the gap between legal-constitutional ideals and the empirical realities of party control in Indonesia’s parliamentary democracy (Van Leeuwen, 2004). Qualitative data are coded thematically to identify recurring patterns of tension, manifested in electoral thresholds, candidate selection mechanisms, coalition dynamics, and public trust indicators. Each dimension is then evaluated according to its conformity with democratic principles such as inclusiveness, accountability, and responsiveness. This method enables a synthesis that not only explains the observable phenomena but also critiques the institutional logic that sustains them. Ultimately, the methodological design underscores a commitment to scholarly rigor and normative coherence, producing findings that contribute meaningfully to both academic discourse and the broader effort to refine Indonesia’s democratic governance.

RESULT AND DISCUSSION

Electoral Thresholds and Wasted Votes Balancing People’s Sovereignty and Party Stability

Electoral thresholds in Indonesia have become a focal point in the tension between people’s sovereignty and political parties’ need for stability, especially as thresholds tend to exclude smaller parties and render votes wasted, thus weakening the ideal that every vote should count. The Constitutional Court’s decision in 2024 declaring the 4 percent parliamentary threshold provision to be not constitutionally rational reflects concern that high thresholds violate principles of electoral fairness and popular sovereignty (Iancu, 2025). Parties and lawmakers, however, defend thresholds pragmatically, arguing that without such barriers the legislative body would be fragmented, making coalition formation and governance unstable. The debate thus becomes one of trade-offs: preserving representational inclusiveness vs enabling effective, coherent governance in a multiparty system.

A precise measure of the scale of wasted votes helps illuminate how thresholds affect voters whose party fails to pass them, thereby not receiving seats in the DPR despite casting valid ballots. According to Perludem’s analysis, in the 2024 election, 17,304,303 votes were considered wasted; this represents a rise compared to the 13,595,842 votes wasted in 2019 (Qolbu, & Wulandari, 2024). The increase suggests that raising or maintaining thresholds corresponds with a larger segment of the electorate being disenfranchised in practice, even though legally they exercised their right to vote. Such empirical data challenges parties to reconcile pragmatic thresholds with normative expectations of sovereignty, showing that party control mechanisms directly shape how many people are represented or left out.

The following table summarizes data on wasted votes in several recent DPR elections to show trends of votes not converted into seats, illustrating the magnitude of the representation gap:

Table 2. Percentage of Wasted Votes and Parliamentary Thresholds in Indonesia’s Legislative Elections (2004–2024)

Year	Number of Wasted Votes (DPR Elections)	Percentage of National Valid Votes Wasted	Parliamentary Threshold for That Year
2004	19,047,481	18.0 %	2.5 % (or as per law at that time)
2014	2,964,975	2.4 %	3.5 %
2019	13,595,842	9.7 %	4 %
2024	17,304,303	—	4 %

Source: MKRI (2024), Simatupang, (2025)

This table reveals that higher thresholds correspond with larger proportions of votes lost, meaning that an increasing number of voters are left without representation, which undermines the ideal of popular sovereignty in favor of party control over who actually enters parliament. The phenomenon of wasted votes forces parties to calibrate their electoral strategies in pragmatic ways: forming alliances, absorbing smaller parties, or ensuring that candidate lists are strong in certain districts to assure passing the threshold (Cox, 1997). Parties with national reach and strong organizational capacity are advantaged in these settings, which increases concentration of power in a few large parties, often at the expense of local or issue-based parties.

From the perspective of the electorate, especially minority or regional groups, this restricts the range of political expression through smaller parties that may more closely represent their interests. Thus, while thresholds stabilize the party system, they tend to reduce responsiveness and dilute representation, which are central to the principle of people's sovereignty.

Opponents of high thresholds point to the erosion of legitimacy when large proportions of votes do not translate into seats, arguing that this signals a gap between formal democracy (voting) and substantive democracy (actual representation). For those scholars and activists, people's sovereignty is compromised when legal mechanisms convert votes into seats in ways perceived as unfair or opaque. Pragmatic defenders respond that some loss is unavoidable within proportional systems to prevent legislative chaos, especially in a geographically vast, populous, and diverse nation like Indonesia. Yet when the gap grows large, the risk is not only institutional distrust but also political apathy, as voters may feel that their participation is futile if their votes "don't count" (Macedo, 2006).

The recent judicial and regulatory debates have begun to shift from whether thresholds should exist to what levels are justifiable and whether alternative designs can reduce wasted votes without sacrificing party stability. The Constitutional Court's ruling that the 4 percent threshold lacks a rational basis pushes the conversation toward rethinking how to balance proportionality and governability. Suggestions include lowering thresholds, introducing effective thresholds (which account for seat numbers in each district), or even implementing compensatory mechanisms to reallocate wasted votes. These proposals aim to preserve the ideal of popular sovereignty by ensuring more votes lead to representation while retaining some of the stability that party control offers.

The connection with party control is especially visible in candidate selection and list positioning, which parties exercise full authority over; thus, even in open-list proportional systems, parties exert control over who appears in winnable positions or which regions they concentrate resources (Hazan, & Rahat, 2006). Voters may choose among candidates, but choices are constrained by which candidates parties permit to stand, and how they rank them. This gatekeeping function allows parties to maintain cohesive ideology (or at least shared interest), manage internal discipline, and assure loyalty, which are pragmatic necessities for survival in a competitive electoral environment. But from the standpoint of people's sovereignty, these mechanisms may inhibit genuine representation of underrepresented voices or disrupt the connection between constituent demands and legislative behaviour.

Political parties argue that thresholds and strong candidate control enable ideological clarity, programmatic consistency, and manageable coalition formation, since too many small or incoherent parties risk opportunism, instability, or gridlock. In practice, coalition formation in Indonesia often occurs post-election, based on bargaining rather than shared platform, which demonstrates the limitations of programmatic continuity even with thresholds meant to promote clarity. The pragmatism embedded in such arrangements sometimes yields compromises in policy or representation that deviate from voters' expectations or prior electoral promises. Thus, while thresholds and party control mechanisms fulfill pragmatic objectives, they also create structural distance between electoral idealism and governance reality (Bader, 2014).

An important countervailing trend is the growing pressure for electoral reform from civil society, academia, and smaller party stakeholders who seek mechanisms to reduce wasted votes and improve proportional representation (Dunleavy, & Margetts, 1995). The empirical evidence of increasing numbers of wasted votes becomes part of their normative argument: if large numbers of citizens vote but are not represented, then legitimacy is at risk. Some proposals are to abolish or lower existing thresholds, or to apply district-level thresholds rather than national thresholds, or to allocate seats in ways that minimize disproportionality. How political parties react to such reforms indicates the balance between idealism and pragmatism: whether they accept reforms that reduce their control in exchange for broader legitimacy or resist them to preserve strategic advantages.

Ultimately, this sub-section shows that electoral thresholds are a concrete mechanism by which party control shapes representative democracy in Indonesia, often in tension with popular sovereignty. Quantitative data reveal that higher thresholds have corresponded with higher wasted votes, which weakens the link between voter intention and legislative outcome. In legal and constitutional debates, the court and reform actors invoke ideals of inclusivity, equality, and proportionality to challenge threshold rules. On the other hand, political parties emphasize governance stability, cost, and prevention of fragmentation, reflecting pragmatism. The balance struck, or not struck, in threshold design will play a key role in whether Indonesia's democracy tends more toward the ideal of people's sovereignty or toward party-centered control.

Trust, Party Identification, and the Distance Between Citizens and Political Parties

An indispensable measure of how well people's sovereignty is realized lies in public trust toward political parties, the legislature (DPR), and other state institutions, because trust both reflects legitimacy and shapes citizen engagement (Ojo, 2022). Low trust undermines the moral authority of parties to claim they speak for the people, and weak identification with parties implies citizens see party structures as remote rather than representative. Survey data repeatedly show that political parties in Indonesia rank among the least trusted institutions, especially when compared to the military, presidency, or local governments. Therefore, understanding levels of trust and party identification becomes essential for diagnosing the gap between idealism (sovereignty, representation) and pragmatism (control, stability).

According to the Indonesia National Survey Project (INSP) 2022, public trust levels in Indonesia's major institutions reveal considerable disparities: The Armed Forces (TNI) were trusted by 89.6 percent of respondents, followed by provincial governments (83.1 percent), district/city governments (81 percent), central government (80.4 percent), and the President (78.7 percent), while political parties lagged behind at 54.6 percent trust and parliament (DPR) at 62.6 percent (Muhtadi, et al., 2023).

This gap between institutions and political parties suggests that people's confidence in party mechanisms is significantly weaker than in other state organs, which has implications both for party legitimacy and for the capacity of parties to claim they embody popular will. Parties' low trust metrics constrain their moral claim to represent citizens and facilitate party control rather than responsiveness. If parties are seen as weak or untrusted, the public may disengage or support non-party alternatives, challenging the existing party-centric order.

More detailed data about party identification, how strongly individuals feel emotional, ideological, or long-term attachment to political parties, illustrates the depth of the disconnect between citizens and parties. Surveys by several institutions, including Politika Research & Consulting (PRC) and Parameter Politik Indonesia (PPI), find that only between 10 to 15 percent of voters report strong party identification, while the majority either loosely support multiple parties or none at all (Observerid, 2024). This implies that even though many participate in elections and vote, most do not see their vote as anchored in stable party loyalty, which weakens the ability of parties to harness public will in a sustained manner. Parties thus must rely more on short-term campaigns, personalities, or patronage rather than programmatic or ideological consistency. Such pragmatic politics may win elections, but it risks undermining normative claims of representation and people's sovereignty in a lasting form.

The following table presents comparative data on trust in political parties and the legislature over time and across different surveys, showing both absolute levels and relative ranking among state institutions:

Table 3. Public Trust Levels in Political Parties and the House of Representatives (DPR) in Indonesia, 2017–2023

Survey / Institution	Political Parties – Trust (%)	Parliament (DPR) – Trust (%)	Rank among Institutions / Relative Position
INSP 2017	45.8 %	55.4 %	Parties last; DPR low-middle ranking

INSP 2022	54.6 %	62.6 %	Slight improvement, but still among least trusted
Kompas (Oct-2022)	44 %	48 %	Reflects decline relative to highly trusted institutions such as TNI, presidency
Indikator Politik Indonesia (Jun-2023)	Only 6.6 % say they <i>really</i> trust parties, 58.7 % trust somewhat, 29.5 % little trust; DPR similarly mixed	—	Indicates many citizens are ambivalent rather than strongly trusting

Source: Muhtadi et al (2023), Kompas (2023), Observerid (2024)

This array shows both variation and durability: trust in parties has risen somewhat, but remains low compared to other institutions, and strong identification remains rare, pointing to persistent distance between voters and party control (Devine, 2024). Low trust and weak identification have concrete consequences for political behavior: voter volatility, ticket-splitting, declining turnout in non-presidential elections, or support for non-party actors or movements. When people do not see parties as trustworthy or responsive, they are less likely to reward consistent policy performance or hold representatives accountable.

Parties may respond by doubling down on pragmatic strategies, emphasizing charismatic leaders, short-term gains, clientelist networks, rather than building ideological coherence, internal democracy, or accountability mechanisms. Over time, this erodes democratic ideals even while preserving stability: citizens vote, but their agency in shaping politics is contingent rather than foundational

Another dimension is the role of local vs national party structures: in many cases, grassroots party branches are weak, internal democracy is limited, and local leaders have less autonomy, meaning party elites at the national level exert disproportionate control. This centralization contributes to the perception that political parties are distant from ordinary citizens, reinforcing distrust. Where candidate selection is top-down, or where local constituencies feel they have little influence over which candidates represent them, sovereignty devolves from the people to party hierarchies. The cumulative effect is that party control rigidifies political representation, reducing responsiveness to constituent needs (Goldfrank, 2007).

The media, civil society, and oversight bodies also influence levels of trust, either by exposing misalignment between party promises and outcomes, or by highlighting corruption, nepotism, or lack of transparency in party operations. When media reports scandals or shortcomings in party performance, citizens' already tentative trust tends to erode further. Civil society organizations often demand reforms: greater disclosure of party finances, open candidate nominations, or internal democratic procedures (Norris, 2017). These demands reflect ideals of people's sovereignty, pushing against party control practices, but pragmatic constraints, financial, legal, political, limit how far parties move in response.

Institutional incentives also matter: parties receive state funding, media access, ballot access, and other perks, but these are often tied to party control, elite networks, and patronage rather than performance or representation (Müller, 2007). When state or regulatory frameworks reward parties for size, loyalty, or centralization, rather than for accountability or representativeness, parties have little incentive to cultivate trust or deeper identification. Reform of funding, regulations, thresholds, or transparency requirements can shift those incentives, but party resistance tends to be strong because control mechanisms confer significant power. Thus, the institutional architecture is not neutral: it often aligns with party interests more than with popular sovereignty.

There is some evidence that incremental improvements are possible: surveys show trust in political parties has slightly increased from the very low levels of earlier years, indicating that reforms or evolving political culture may be gradually bridging the gap. For example, INSP's data show that from 45.8 percent political party trust in 2017 to 54.6 percent in 2022 is an improvement, though still lower than many other institutions. Parties that engage in accountability, transparency, and local outreach tend to outperform those that do not in public perception, suggesting that people's sovereignty can be better approximated even under party control if parties adapt. Nevertheless, the magnitude of

change remains moderate, and many citizens remain distrustful or disengaged, sustaining the tension (Lenard, 2008).

Summing up the sub-section, the data on trust and identification demonstrates that people's sovereignty, while formally upheld in elections and constitutional law, is often attenuated in practice by party control structures and institutional culture. Low levels of strong trust or identification signal that many citizens feel their political voice is filtered or mediated by parties that do not fully reflect their interests or values. Pragmatic imperatives, electoral survival, centralization, party discipline, frequently dominate over normative ideals of responsiveness, inclusion, and accountability. For representative democracy in Indonesia to lean more toward idealism, reforms need both structural change (laws, thresholds, internal party democracy) and cultural change (trust, identification), and both are challenging given entrenched interests. Therefore, trust metrics are not peripheral concerns but central to assessing whether sovereignty lies truly in the people or is constrained by party control.

CONCLUSION

The findings of this study reveal that Indonesia's representative democracy remains in a delicate balance between the idealism of people's sovereignty and the pragmatism of political party control. Constitutional principles place sovereignty firmly in the hands of the people, yet the structural mechanisms of electoral thresholds, party discipline, and candidate selection have centralized authority within political organizations. Empirical evidence, such as the growing number of wasted votes and the persistently low levels of public trust in political parties, demonstrates that the translation of citizen will into political representation remains imperfect. While electoral reforms and judicial interventions have aimed to correct these imbalances, entrenched party interests and institutional inertia continue to restrict genuine inclusivity and responsiveness, leaving citizens partially alienated from the institutions that claim to represent them.

At the same time, the endurance of Indonesia's democratic framework, despite these challenges, shows that the system's evolution is dynamic rather than static. The persistence of reformist discourse, civil society advocacy, and incremental improvements in transparency suggest that the ideals of sovereignty have not been extinguished but are continually negotiated within pragmatic constraints. Future democratic consolidation will depend on recalibrating the relationship between the electorate and parties—reducing barriers that exclude representation while incentivizing accountability and trust. Achieving this equilibrium requires both structural reform in electoral law and cultural renewal within political parties, ensuring that Indonesia's democracy matures toward a model where people's sovereignty is not merely constitutional rhetoric but a lived political reality

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